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This discuc::,::::,ion of Diego de Vargas er;ccl1npa::::':::,ec::; :3everal moj or t::1eme'3 
that e;d,:::,ted during his time, They in,:bde the personal life of de 
Vargas, his quest to reconquer New Mexico, and his term as Governor of 
Ney,r Mexico. While covering de Vo.rga3 life in depth, :wu will rea,i ,c,bout 
the Pue~la Indian Revolt of 1680, the encamienda, the presidio, and 
ki·va. fherE i:::, a deep COIDI)dl:"i:30I1 tha.t i~3 interl::onne(:ted thr2u6hD~Jt the 
discussion tha~ relates de Vargas life to tie plight of the Na~ive 
Am-::ri,:aJ.:3. Herein lie:::, the ~tJckgrGund ,:..~nd story of the reconql1t?'3t or 
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The Spani",;h reconquest of the New Mexican terri tory under Diego de 
Vargas in 1692 was a vital part of continued Spanish expansion in the 
HeH World. The Pueblo Revolt in 1680 was the last major attempt by the 
Indians to throw off the yoke of Spanish domination, yet little is knoHn 
publically about the reconqueror. The intention of this report is to 
de~.ve further into the story of the reconquest and find out more about 
who Don Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponce de Leon Has. 
This report analyzes the various aspects of the reconquest, both 
from the point of view of the Indians and of the Spanish. The first 
chapter looks at the tension and conflict",. which Dccured betHeen the 
separate cultures. The faith and stubborness of the Spanish Houldn't 
aLow them to understand the ,::;omplexity of the pueblo Indians' faith and 
society. This resulted in the coordinated uprising that we know as the 
Pueblo Revolt of 1680. 
The second chapter deals with the revolt and the period of twelve 
years that the Indians were free of Spani3h influence. Here we take a 
IODk at the period during which the Indians; reverted back to their way 
of living they possessed before the interference of the Spanish. We'll 
see the futile attempt.::. by the Spanish colonist,:; to plead their cause 
wi -:h the Spanish crown until Diego de Vargas ventures. to the New World 
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The third chapter details the organization and advance of the 
company led by Vargas to confront the Indians and win back the 
territory. It is in this section that the background of Diego de 
Vargas' life will be revealed and discussed. 
The fourth chapter will cover the long process of recolonization of 
the New Mexican territory by the Spaniards. Not only did the soldiers 
and govf:;rnment administrators have it difficul t, but the missionarie,::, 
who were trying to convert the Indians did too. This section takes a 
closer :.ook at the struggle of the colonists to tame a harsh, foreign 
land. 
The final chapter is a brief overview of the history of the Spanish 
conquest: prior to Diego de Vargas. Tti:3 provides 'E.ome background 
information that will help tie the previous. four chapters. together. 
The Southwestern United States is a harsh environment for anyone to 
live in, but the success that the Native Americans have had in tho:3e 
surroundings is phenomenal. Part of the reason for that success has 
been thE' religion and traditions of this people. That the Indians were 
able to take those parts of Christianity that they could incorporate 
into their tradi tional religion i:3 a factor which ha:3 allowed tht very 
religion to endure and flourish. 
Tate a trip with me now back to that vi tal time in tlle history of 
the Southwe:3t WheT! Indians still practiced their traditional ways and 
the hOH.e and the whi te man were foreign conceptions. Thi!3 i:3 the story 
of the F'ueblo Indians' greate3t triumph and the man who forced them to 
ado-::it tLe ways of the whi tes. 
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TURMOIL IN NEW MEXICO 
It was in early '3pring of 1598 that ~::;pani'3h :=;oldier,; and colonists 
crossed the ford of the Rio Granri(? into the proilin.::e CJf Xl~W M.exl',=':l, 
(Andec::.cm, :353 1 It 1;'D.:3 at thi:3 point that the Spanish tool;: pos;e:;'3.icm 
would change the lives of the pueb!o Indians forever. These items 
inc:ludec. domesti!:' grain:;, gunF,owder, metal tooL" and livestock, 
e:3pecially horses. (And(::rson, 3'3:3) Two of the most important thi ngs they 
brolJght with them that aren't mentioned already are Christianity and the 
Spani:3h coloi'"ial F,ol icy, the en,:omienda. 
The encomienda was the form of colonial government first used by 
Christopher Columbus when he reached the West Indies. (Anderson, 353) 
Thi::, is quite possibly the reason l>{hy the rfative American:::; today refer 
to Columbus as a butcherer and a murderer. It's not so much that he 
mas:::;a(;rei thousands of Indian:3, it':::;: that he i'::. cre::iited 3.:3 the first 
European to discover the AmerIca:::; a.nd developed the system which tn.=: 
Indians "ere governed by for over a century. Through encornienda the 
land belDnged to the king and was parcelled to tho:::.e who participated in 
the conquest of the territory. It also set up a crude form of serfdom 
through which an abundant E,ource of labor was gained. This source wa:::: 
the Indians living on the divided sections of the territory. 
The Spanish apparetly disliked getting their hands dirty with 
trivial vlork because that is what was left up to the Indians to 
complete. The Indian:::; were abused and forced to do the mo,::;t menial of 
--
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tasks by their Spanish proprietors. Al though slavery wa.!::· outlawed, on 
the froLtier where it was hard for the king's justice to reach it wa:3 
pra·:::ticE'd by some of the coloni~5t:;. One of the main goal!5 of the 
Spanish conqueror::=; was to Europeanize the Indians, and the encomienda 
'da:3 one method that the colonist!::: relied upon to handle this, process. 
ThE; other method that the Spanish used was through their zealou,=, 
attemptc:: to convert the Indians to Christianity. The Indians were 
1001red tpon as pagans who wor'3hiped the devil and his minion!3. The 
mis!3ionc.ries who journeyed to the puebloes to set up churches were an 
ever prEsent nuisance to the Indians' tradi tional way:=;. Through 
Chri!::,tiJnization it was believed that the souls of the Indiam:; could be 
saved ard that they might also learn a civil culture, like the Spanish 
have for example. To drive out the wickednes::=; of the Indians' foul 
practicES the priests and friars would have soldiers en~er the kivas of 
the Indians and either destroy or confiscate everything they found 
inside. A kiva is an underground ceremonial chamber where the Indian':=; 
rehE::arsed their ceremonials, and conducted their most sacred ri tuals. 
The kiva is a representation of the pueblo Indian belief that they 
emerged into thi.s world from a hole in the ground. Each kiva has a hole 
somewhere in it which is supposed to :3ymbolize the point of emergence, 
After the priests had the kivas demolished they would try to persuade 
the Indians to denounce their ways, A converted Indian wa:5 considered 
to be one that had been baptized and was practicing Christian doctrine 
and attending mass. Eventually. pagan practices would be banned and 
anyone c:wght practicing them could be beaten or impri!::;oned, Indian 
--
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childrer. were sometime'::, taken into the mi,:::sion by the priests a.nd ro,i':.oed. 
as if ttey '({ere European children. This wa'3 .3.d7a.ntageou,=" in that the 
chiLdrer. were educated and ta~ght to speak Spanish, but in ret~rn they 
had to E,ive '~p their traditional ':;U:3tOJU:3 and language. They would only 
be allowed to visit with their parents on special occasions because they 
often wouldn't return to the mission once they were allowed to leave. 
The ten'3ion that arose between the pueblo Indians and the Spaniard,::; 
was cau:=;ed by both the encomienda ""'Y,=,tem and Christianity, but there 
weH~ two other factors that played a major part in creating the 
hos,ti 1 it ies. Those two factor3 I-fere: the tributes levied upon the 
Indian"", sometimes forciblY;3.nd the la,:;k of security the Spanish 
pro'videc against the 10,,,,t11e, noma.die bands of Indians like the Navajo 
and the Apache. The tribute the Indians were forced to pay included 
ite:ms like mdize, pottery, deer-:3kins, beans, cottonb::'anket::" fowl, and~t 
num'~er (:f other trinket:::. (Anderson, :35'7) At fir-st many of these item':::. 
wert= offered freely tD the whi te-s,kinned :3trangers:., but a:3 the need for 
food increasl:::d during the '",inter the amount of tribute demanded rose. 
One of the primary out,:;ide factors that both the Spaniards and the 
pue'~lo Indians ha.d to contend with was the raid,:; 'by the nomadic tribe's. 
The Spar.iards never had enough soldiers in the New Mexican territory to 
protect the :3ett1ements, mis:sions, and pueblo,:;. Noma.di,:; bands wou 1d 
snea.k ir.to places well :3i:ocked from recent harvests and steal whatever 
they cOLld carry off. The introduction of the horse into Indian culture 
made thi:3 ta:-3k easier because bands of Utes, Apaches, or- Havajos could 
sweep 1r.to a settlement, take what they wanted, and be gone !)efore any 
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threatering form of resistance could be gathered. These bands were a 
neme:3is especially after the harvasting time had passed because they 
knew that there was a abundance of food available at that time. Thes;e 
four factors did nothing to improve the relationship between the SpaLl:::: 
and the Indians, and as the seventeenth ceL~ury ~~re u. 
con~licts resulting in ~ic~en -
f Dr the ,"!.,..: -+ ~ --'-'-- .... --=-
.·~~~l o~Lasions when the various 
_ 'deft; uJ~ le,:;ted from the encomiendas. The church-state friction 
cut dOVlT! on the effective administration of the territory by the 
Government and eventually this would weaken the defen:3ive front that the 
Spanish could present. The Spanish troops became lax in tieir duties 
and they would eventually regard serving at distant outposts as a form 
of punishment or banishment. (Anderson, 371) 
During the late seventeeth century a series of drough:s struck the 
New Mexi:o territory, adding to the hards,hips the IndiaL::: 
fa.':e,d, (Anderson, :~.69) Wi 'eh the struggle to meet the de1llt3.nd:3 of the 
tributes imposed upon them by "he ;::;pani:3h, the Indian:::. had litt:e tilE-=-
to take ,:are of their own fields. Crops 'such a::: maize and cotton 
failed, ,Hld the E:pani':::,h demancied more work from the laborers. The 
populations cf several of the pueblos declined during this period due to 
the resuLting famine and disease. Also, th,= Indians ran a.way in a 
-
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de:spera";e hope that they could find refuge among their nomadic neighbors 
and e:3cape the harsh envi ronment the pueblo'3 had become, 
THE REVOLT OF 1680 
In the year 16.'30 there occurred what most hi:3torians consider to be 
the only lDr3.j or succes:sful revol t by the pueblo Indians against tLle 
Spanish in their New World empire. Al though the succe::;:; wa:s only 
tem?orary, the Indians managed to drive the Spaniards south of the 
pre:3ent Mf?xican-American border and hold them at bay for twel ve years. 
That wac: quite a feat con:sidering the diver:sity of the variOU:3 pueblos 
and the ~ack of unity they normal ~y exhi bi t, The method used to uni te 
the puetlos was ingeniOUS, but has never been duplicated, 
The pueblo Indians had been severely influenced by the culture 
introduced by the Spanish, 0.1 though they vehemently reslo:::.ted those part~3 
they found unattractive. On several occasions there had been uprisings 
by the various pueblos prior to 1680, None of these had been 
succe'3sful, however, and the Spaniard's had easily pu dmm the revol ts 
and remained in control of the terri tory. The event"" p'Jt into motion 
for the Revolt of 115 i30 to s!1.:,:;eed were numerou".' and difii .. :;ult to folloy!. 
AftE:r th:'! revolt occurred,3everal pueblo IndiaT6 We!'2 (,Jpcured and 
interrog3.ted by .spanish officiaL" in an attempt 1;0 di",cover who had 
devi".'.ed ,:md led the Revol t. Here's wha,t they lear-ned, 
The pueblo Indians believe in a variety of spirits, generally 
having o~e for almost any natural occurance or object, They call these 
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5piri~s "kachinas," although the spelling and pronunciation differs from 
pueblo group to pueblo group. The kachina that directed this revolt 
against the Spani:3h is said to have been Pohe-yemo, the sun 
spirit. (Chavez, 92) The individual who portrayed Pohe-yemo was not 
signiflca~t to the Indians because they believe that whoever wears the 
cost];me of the spirit hac:; been pos.sessed and is the form the spirit ha:3 
deigned to wear on this world. Some historians have hypothe:3ized that 
the rea:30n that the :3Ur. spiri twas enos,en is beed.use of it::: elmo,e 
resemblaD.:e to the AztE<; god of Fire and 'War. (Chavez, 9:3) That would 
reqUire c knowledge of the deities of the natives of New Spain, which 
few Indians would have possessed. 
A theory developed by Fra.y Angelico Chavez sug8'e::;ted that rohe-yemo 
wasn't e'len a di::,guised India.n, but rather a mulatto of Mexican-~ndian 
ancestry, <Chavez, 95) This i:3 unlikely, however, becau:3e the tight 
social structure of a pueblo and the years of apprenticeship would 
require 3. large span of time to achieve the status necessary to be the 
repre:3entative of Pohe-yemo, (Beninato, 41<'3) Those captives who were 
intE:rigated descri be Pohe-yema as being very tall and black. He was 
said to have large yellow eye:3 al:30, <Chavez, 87) 
Mo::,t historians and writers point to a tri bal leader named Pope as 
the moving force behind the Revolt. The Spaniards had forbidden kachina 
dance'3 and raided the kivas to de'3tray mask:3 and other ceremonial items. 
<Benina:o, 418) Resi::;tallce increased among the natives as the 
missiondries became more determined than ever to bring a hal t to the:::;e 
heathen practices. Indian leaders were often arre::::.ted and ei ther 
-9-
.-
humiliated or killed by the Spaniards. Pope became the :=ymbol of 
"uncompromising host! Ii ty to the conquerors" and the unque:3t ionable 
leader of the major pueblos. (Beninato, 419) 
Pope waf3 a Tewa medicineman y,ho struggled to resist the :::po.:-li:::i 
religion and keep alive the rituals and tr~dition~, 
peop:Le. Pope ho.d teen tr~~- ,:"', .. 
The 
"':\8ered at a pri:::;oner for telling what the 
~:i'iernor believed was an Indian fa.hle that he had the pri:30ner shot for 
mocking :lim. <Chavez, S8) 
Pope began telling his people that the spirits were displeased with 
them bec~use of their acceptance of the Spanish religion. The only way 
the ::spirits could be appea:3ed i:3 if the Spaniard:3 were forced to leave 
their land. He moved his base of operations to Taos becau:3e ot its 
remote lo.::ation and began to hold secret organizational 
mee<:ing:::. (Beninato, 419) One of the native:3 is, reported saying the 
Pohe-yemo came from the north and in::::tructed all of the Indian::; to take 
part in the treason and rebellion. <Chavez, Sa) They feared the vrrath of 
Pohe--yeno more than they feared the Spaniards, so they planned to take 
part in the revolt. 
The plan.",: were devised '3~ all of the pueblo:3 r:;ould revolt in a 
unified front and oust the Spaniards. Two runners were sent out to all 
of the :)ueblo:3, each carryi ne; a knotted cord which signified how many 
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days woul:l pas,'::; until the final mes:::;age was delivered from Pohe-yemo. 
After the runners had passed through every pueblo, the medicinemen and 
chiefs began holding special gatherings, At these meetings t.he 
medicinellen would explain to the people that the spirits were angry with 
them and had sent a sign t.o show how t.hey might be appeased. The people 
were told that a second :;::;i8n would arrive heralding the moment when they 
were to rise up in rebellion against the Spaniards. 
The Indian belief in spirits and the realization of what might 
happen if they didn't heed the warnings united unlikely allie:::, at this 
juncture in the hist.ory of the pueblos. The Hopi Indians are a 
peaceful, gentle people who have never condoned the use of violence to 
solve t.hc~ir problems. However. during this period an exception was made 
and for ";he only time in the recorded hi:::,tory of the Hopi people they 
joined tie revolt and rose up against the Spanish. 
Aft\~r a period of time had elapsed the runners again appeared in 
the Villages carrying the knotted cords. On this occasion, each cord 
was knotted bfice. This meant that the pueblo Indian:3 should unite on 
the second nevi moon and attack and dri ve out the Spaniards, "So in 
August, 1680, after almost a century of oppre:=.sion, the pueblo Indian:3 
rose in revolt and forced the Spanish to withdraw south to the EI Paso 
region." (Schroeder, 298) The reason the plan worked :30 well wa:::, becau:;::,e 
only the chief:; and medicinemen were entrusted with its detail.s until 
the day when the actual revolt occurred. 
"Tte intentions of the Indians had been to arise at specified time 
and seize the arms of the surpri'3ed Spaniards, killing as many as 
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p0::3sible, sparing neither men, women, nor children." (Bailey, 2) Every 
location Ln New Mexico except Santa Fe wa:3 depopulated of Spaniards. A 
siege was laid on E:anta Fe that lasted for five days. The India.ns were 
routed at that time but the Spuniards were s.till isolated from any 
source of reinforcement. II All together, over four hundred Spanish men, 
women, and children lost their live:3 in the revolt, including twenty-one 
mis.:3i,onarie:3. It (Bailey, 3) The victory was a complete SlJl:;ce:3S except for 
the failure to capture Santa Fe, and the Indians would be free of 
Span:lsh interference for twelve years. 
During the absence of the Spaniards between 1680 and 1692, a number 
of pueblos moved to new sites. The Jemez, Keres, and Tanos moved their 
home:3 to new locations. The five Zuni pueblo:3 merged into one because 
of pressure from Apache attacks. The Hopi, plagued by attacks from the 
Utes, moved all of their pueblo:3 ex,:ept Oraibi to the me:3a tops. 
(Schroedpr, 299) Since the common threat had been disposed of, the 
friction between the pueblo tribe::; increased again and strife was ripe. 
This str!fe caused Indians from the southern pueblos to journey with the 
Spanish '''hen they reentered pueblo ,:;ountry in 1681-
The shift of pueblos to defensive positions between 16.'30 and 1692 
has been thought by some to have been due to fear of repris.a 1 by the 
SpaLiard3 if they returned. However, evidence suggests that old 
enmities as well as new ones. flared high during the absence of the 
Spaniards and required immediate act i on to handle hosti 1 it ies: clo:3e at 
hand. The Spanish sent punitive expeditions northward eluring 1681 and 
1687, but these discovered nothing of significance. The expedition by 
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de Vargas in 1692-93 found several pueblos ready to do battle, while 
others scught refuge elsewhere before the Spaniards approached their 
pueb:Lm3. (Schroeder, 300) After the return of the Spani:3h in 1692, 
Indian al ignment:3 shifted one wa.y or another according to events. 
THE RECONQUEST OF NEW MEXICO 
Bebfeen 1681-1682 Governor Otermin made an attempt to regain the 
province with an unsuccessful and controversial campaign. It did 
afford, ;lOwever, an opportunity to collect more imortant te:3timony from 
the Indians concerning the Revolt. Otermin discovered that following 
the defeat of the Spanish, Pope made a tour of inspection through all of 
his puebLos. "He demanded large tributes, taught the intricate steps of 
the old ,:::eremonial dances, and insisted that they treat him with the 
f.:,amE cer::mony a>.:" they had accorded former Spanish governors." (Sanchez, 
138) These action quickly alienated the pueblos and brought about the 
downfall of Pope. 
From 1692 to 1693 Don Diego de Vargas traipsed around the New 
Mexico terri tory re::::,ubj ugating the variolY3 pueblos. However, he was 
born in Madrid, Spain, on 8 November 1643, Diego Jo::::,eph de Vargas Zapata 
y Luj an Pon,::e de Leon y Contreras. (Ke::::'sell, 11) What occurred in his 
li:fE~ during the period between his birth and the reconque:;t'? Thi:=:. is 
wha': we're going to look at at the beginning of thl':; .:;hapter. 
DiEgO had an older broth.:>r, Lorenzo, whom he grew 1Jp with in 
Mad::-id, "The position th.3.t hi'::; father held allowed him to grow up with 
--
-13-
the middl:,;--ranking nobi I i ty of the capital. On 5 Kay 1664, Diego was 
ruarrj.ed to Beatriz :F'imentel de Pro.do. It (Ke:::;se11, 12-13) From the summer 
of 1666 until the summer of 167 2, de Vargas personally managed the 
famEy properties. There were a thousand minor detail.s and more debts 
than inceme. Diego knew that among his family ance,::;tors he had warrior-
knigits, bishops, and counselors to kings. The depressions and reverses 
that Spain wa:3 experiencing during his lifetime couldn't have escaped 
his notice. Difficulties in agricultural production forced cash-poor 
landed families like his deeper and deeper into debt. 
Diego made a calculated decision due to his financial plight to 
enter in1;o royal service. He was aware that thi~. offered regular pay 
for honorable employment, and stories from America offered the prospect 
of making a fortune so that the family name could be maintained. In 
1673 de '!argas made the crossing to New Spain and was granted a post 
·::;outhea:::.t of Mexico City. (Kes'3ell, 17) It wa'::; at this place that he 
learned of the death of his 32-year old wife, Beatriz, the mother of his 
four children. Letter~ mailed home from Diego hint of loneliness and 
homE'sickne:3s, and in 1675 it is noted that he contemplated returni ng to 
Madrid. However, after his term of two yean:. his performance was 
reviewed and he was judged an exemplary official. (Ke:=;:3ell, 17) Little 
is documented of the seventeen years he spent in New Spain before he 
rOdE! north to as'3ume the g;overnorship of New Mexico. 
Diego de Vargas had aspirations and hopes of reconquering the 
valuable country of New M.exico which had been lo~;t to the Indians in 
1680. Be believed this a.:;complishment would win royal favor and 
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consequently re'I'fard,::, of new ti tIes and higher appointments. Vargas 
planned en executing the entire expedition at his own expense, which 
would have been great indeed because he would have had to arm and supply 
the soldiers traveling with him. "On February 22, 1691, de Vargas began 
preparations for his journey north." (Bailey, 12) 
After taking stock of the forces and supplies available to him he 
anno'Jncee. that the trip would have to be delayed becau,::,e of the lack of 
food, supplie,::, and reinforcements needed for 'this delicate operation. 
Due to unforseeable obstacles, it would be a year and a half before de 
Varg3.s left El Pa:::,o on his journey north. Conditions became so 
unbe3.rab~e in EI Paso that the colonists petitioned to be allowed to 
move eL3~~where because of the poverty and suffering that was pres,ent 
there, ~~he enthusiasm of de Vargas was undaunted, hm-,ever, and he 
endeavon"d to gain reinforcements for his task. 
Finnl preparations for the reconquest were under way by April 17, 
1692, and Vargas wrote to the viceroy that he would dispatch the first 
unit on July 12. (Bailey, 20) The former inhabitants of New Mexico were 
notified that they should prepare themselve:::, for the trip. However, in 
spite of the offers in the form of land, titles, free mlJnit:ioL~, 
and food, the order W2t::;. ba3ica,11y ~;~':.::',,:< 
Ii 1J _ . 
...... c 
that wouldn'~ :e c~~rge: .U 
- - -.:::- Ie V~[8as decided not to wait for the 
-
. , ,lid L .11 the rei nf orcements, The journey of reconquest was on. 
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The reconque'3t marks the beginning of a century-long dependence on 
pueblo ILdian auxiliaries for the pacification and defense of New 
Spai n' s Ilorthermnost frontier, Pueblo Indians were not lJ'3ed exten::3i vely 
by the Spaniards for early campaigns against the raiding tribe:=" These 
Indians Nere initially considered unwarlike, and it was assumed that 
they wouLd be no match for the ferocity of the Apaches, (Jones, 36) For 
thi:=, venture Vargas was alloted three squad:3 of soldiers from the 
presidio of El Paso and another fifty soldiers from another presidio, 
To complete his force'3 Diego wa:3 allowed to pick 100 Indian warriors 
from a nearby pueblo. (Jones, 38) 
One of the invaluable services that these pueblo Indians did for 
the Spar.ish was to act as interpreters and reliable informants. The 
expedition moved northward on a course that roughly followed the Rio 
Grande, During most of the march the friendly Indian warriors went 
ahead of the main expedition to act as scouts so that the presence and 
strength of expected resistance could be determined, During the trip de 
Vargas Learned from his scouts that several of the pueblos were fighting 
against each other, This allowed him to employ tL.~ te<::llTli'~ 
o .' _, • 
tribe ~ -, _ . .:, -11 __ '. __ <- = 
price he asked for before agreeing to 
By :noving :3wiftly, Vargas was able to reconquer most of the 
-
prDvince before the Indians could again unite, 
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Finding the pueblos along the Rio Gr~n~e abandoned be~ause the 
Indians h~d f:ed, Var8~s and his Far~y continued to Santa ~e. They 
arrived after d3rk before the town, which was occupied by Tano Indians 
beCil'-;3e they preferred th,:: white man's fo;:m oi habitation to their own. 
fhe Spa~i~rds had a difficult time convincing the Tanos that they were 
truly who they cIa.imed to be. "The Tanos believed these were not 
Spaniards, but Apaches and Pecos In disguise." (~aileYI 38) They 
threatened to "kill all ':if che ;3paniEl.rri-s at one bloH" be,:au:::.e th.::spirit 
of fightin;s was upon them. (Bailey, -39) 
haltE;d in an open field with no cover ex':ept for ~he rOW-3 of IIlDize 
nearby. 
of p"'iJ,ce to ~hem. 
They believed the Spaniards intended to do the same to them. 
At this paint the rest ~! the troops and the supplies arrived. 
Vargas orders them to halt beside the corn fields. but within musket 
shot from where the conill·::;t Wi3.S occurring. He also had the fie16 
cannons readied for use incase things got out of hand. The Indians Here 
dist~rbed by these preparations and lost a lot of their defiant 
atti+ude. (Bailey, 41) 
A crowd of Indian:s from nearby vi llages who were wield! ng long 
spe3rs hai gathered on the periphery of the conflict. Varg().s~ fearing 
treachery. ordered part of the soldiers. to move into a pos;1 ':1 on to 
intercept them if they 3hould become violent. Then he pLt into action a 
--17-
pla.n intended to i'solate Santa Fe from its water supply and to prev<:::nt 
any attempt at outside communication. (Bailey, 42) 
Th8,=,e mea'3ure'=' were effec"tive in forcing the Indians to talk on 
more aggrea ble term,=,;. The Tanos asked why the Spaniards took these 
measures when they r::laimed tt] come in peace, They then asked that the 
pad.res au:·omp3.nying Var83'3' expe,jition be allowed to enter the villa. 
Vargas believed that the Indian::; planned to harm the padres. He also 
beliwled the Indians were '=;+:,3.11inz; and was upset that thi2Y hadn't made 
any dttempts to t,aU;: more about peace. 
Vargas positioned his troops at strategic locations and then 
deliV'ered an Jltimatum to the Tanos. "He granted them just one hour to 
surrender; otherwise they would be destroyed with fire and great 
Slaughter." (B~iley, 43) The Tanos responded that they would do as he 
wished, ':;0 Vargas had his trooF3 ",.tep cown but rem3.in on alert. After 
waiting two hours Vargas sent in an Indian emissary to talk with the 
Tanos and to find out what the IL.r:iians planned. (Bailey, 43\ 
"Domingo, the Indian emissary, had little effect upon the Tanos and 
reported ba,:k that the Tanos were continuiE8 to fortify the villa." 
(Bailey, 43) Vargas, enragec and exasperated. ordered his solaiers back 
into position and prepared the cannsns to be fired at the walls of Santa 
:;'2. Var,~as implored the Indians one last time to '3eek Feace, knmving 
full "iel~ that he ,:ould defeat the Indians '=,in<::~'e their water supply was 
cut off, The Tanos real ized the hopele'3'3 situation they ~,ere in and 
:3ent two unarmed delegates to dis(:u::o;:s the term,s of peace. (Batley, 
44) 
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The Indian • .;omen were the fir::3t to surrender. Then the other Tanos 
g~adJally filtered out ot the villa, unsure of the reception that 
awai te·i 1 hem. "The Spaniards patiently and carefully assured the 
Indi~n3 of their peaceful intentions and of their desires for native 
welfare Jnd happiness." cBailey, 45) The Spaniards then withdrew to 
their encampment and made precations for nightfall. After a religious 
ceremony wa=; held the following mornins- to absolve the Indians of their 
sin'3, the retaking of Santa Fe was complete. "Vargas later confessed 
that he :lad 81 ven up hope of con-'lincing the nati ve'3 to surrender without 
a fight." (Beck, e7) 
The deci=,ive factor whi·:h may have3pelled =:,ucce:3:3 for the SpaEi=;h 
cau=·e wa3 when a former lieutenant of Pope entered de Vargas' camp and 
offered to assist in any way possible. This Indian, "Don Luis Tupatu," 
was very influential in organizing a force of friendly Indians to aid 
the ~::paniards. CBeck, 87) Tupatu also broughl; val'_'.3,t,le iTLfc'r:'-:'~'..::-c 
other pueblos with him. 
'-:: = __ '1. '::'_. 
II 0 .. : ~. _ ~_ • 
,1 . ..; [: ;' ~ ,~ 8 a II. d the Cd tho 1 i::: c 11 u r c h. H (Ba i 1 e y, 4 S ) 
II Sc me '.:1 ') 1 ,., w • .:.:..r.L'-t mostly children, were baptized. "" (Beck, 
This renarkable success could be accounted for by the very daring 
87) 
chances Vargas took. taking such a small group of :30ldiers into hostile 
Indian territory, espe'::'ially that of the we:3tern pueblo:;, and 
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effe:::tivE.ly scaring and intimida_ting them into submis~3ion wa3 indeed a 
"On several occa:3ions some of the pueblo::; '",ere prepared to rise 
again:3t ·:he Spaniards, but luck, fear of retaliation, and division among 
the Indians enabled Vargas to win." (Beck, 87) 
RECOLONIZATION OF THE TERRITORY: 1693 
Having at least obtained the silent submission of the pueblos, 
Va.rE;a":, retraced hL; steps to El Pa:3o to prepare for the permanent 
oc:cupation of New Mexico. He wa" basically given a free hand in working 
out this phase of the enterprise. Everything necessary for the 
pre:;ervation of that which had been won wa:" promised. 
For the establi:"hment of a presidio at Santa Fe, Vargas was 
authorized to enli3t :301dier:3 from among those of the presidio:;:, of El 
PaSD and Parral who had participated in the expedition just completed. 
CEs;:"inm,a, 113) He was 0.1:;:.0 empowered to enlist additional soldier:3 for 
the presidio from the area surrounding El Paso, guaranteeing the usual 
Var ga:3 '~las given permi::,,::,ion to take from El Paso a:3 many of the 
families there as he should deem necessary to colonize New Mexico. 
without endangering the security of that region. "Those settlere who 
had bee,l driven out of New Mexico in 1680, and who had promie;ed to 
return upon its restoration, shoud be notified that aid would be assured 
for the:_r undertaking." (Espinosa, 11:3) It was also placed at Vargas' 
-
disposa~ enough pesos to pay the starting expenses for this second 
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e xpE·(:ii t i :ra. Vargas y,a'::; made personally respon:si ble fm- thanking the 
military leaders, the missionaries, the soldiers, and any others who 
aided in the success of the first enterprise. 
He W,3'S armed wi th ab:solute power when he began prepatations for the 
second journey, To determi ne the exact number .::;f _, :).=-c 
willing to return ~o New Mex!~c 
", y{hich explainEd to Vargas why the 
:'-;',' i d::; were so large, som,":' having over thirty inhabitants. They 
lacked ~ufficient clothing and less than half had a horse to use for 
transportation. "Most of the residents expressed their willingness to 
reSt?t tIe New Mexico provided government assistance wa:3 def i ni tely 
a:ssured them." \Espino5a, 11'5) "The sum of 40,000 peso:s was deemed 
sufficient to finance the enlisting of soldiers and the gathering of 
set":.ler:::, the granting of ne'~es:::;ary aid to the impoveri:::;hed inhabi tant~. 
of ~l Paso and the purchasing of supplies to sustain the expedition and 
the coleny." (Espinosa, 11:3) Vargas was required to keep a complete 
inventory of all purchases so tha.t payments could be rr.ade quickly. " "De 
governor was empowered to draw3ddi tional sums if he should con:sider it 
Vargas looked into the future and tried to predict what might be 
useful for the protection of Santa Fe and the surrounding area. He 
-
reqlJestEd new guns and ammunition, plus an additional amount of pesos to 
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be used for the building of the presidio at Santa Fe. Along with these 
he asked for four artillerymen. "A total of one hundred soldiers was 
enlisted for the expedition." (Espinosa, 129) 
"Ai:. the train was declared ready at three o' clock in the 
of October 13, 1693, when it pulled OU -:. :=:£ J_' _ .:.. .~ ••. _ 
_ '_ ~'. ",.3: 
~., ." 
" ~~~~:t~; ¥,d,:3 tcLd by an Indian informant that a :3pokesman among the 
pueblo Indian:3 "had induced them to refuse peace with the Jemez, Teguas, 
and Tano;, and become friends of the Spaniards." (Bail(?y, 95) The 
present upproach of the Spaniards had consequently aroused fear of a 
sudden and fateful end to Indian existence. He was told that the Jemez, 
Teguas, Ta.nos, and Picuris were planning to fight the Spaniardt=:; when 
they appeared. 
At:he same time, further north of Varga3' c:l1upany, the ;3panLJrd=" 
were suf::ering consider,;;,bly frOID sno',,-, frost, and ('ind. i':ventually 
Var8<ls' :ompany wOljld meet up wi tn thL;:; group. They 5topped over at the 
pueblo o~ San Felipe, of which Vargas had this to write to th~ Viceroy: 
"And there was a stairway to the entrance of the pueblo 
and :ikewise in the houses, and in the strong plaza seats, 
benches, and new ha~~ocks for me to be seated. And 
they gave us all to eat with great abundance, ana made 
demonstration of grea.t happiness; and repeated what 
is referred to above, adding that they would go with 
me to the Jemez who had more food supplies,1t <Bailey, 96) 
--
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The Indians offered to bring whatever food Vargas needed for his company 
in exchange for any support and protection they might need in the 
future, Varga'3 agreed, so the Indians :3ent mules loaded with meat., 
beans, flour, and maize, 
"Tte entire Spanish force, which included three companie:3 compri:3ed 
of :3ettlers, soldiers, and mi:3sionary fathers, were united on November 
19, 169:~." (Bailey, 101) Vargas issued orders for everyone to remain 
t08,=ther while he and the fathers went ahead to find a Detter location 
for them to camp. They v{ere welcomed by the Indian:3 in Cochi ti and took 
oe£;:Jre c. crO:35 the Indians had erected wi thin the pueblo walls, The 
SpaniarG:3 were rewarded wi th :sacks of corn, threshed maize, and corn 
f lOJr, vrhich ,.{ere carried to the foot of the mesa. 
At the main encampment, Vargas held a parley with four Pecos 
Indians who pas:3ed on to him valuable information. They spoke about 
the ase:::.E·mbling of Indians from several tribes who planned on ambushing 
the SpaIliards at an abandoned pueblo, The Indians would have their 
£or::e:3 clivid3d between hm hill:3, and ae::: the Spaniards pa'3sed betweE:n 
them the Indians would fall upon them from the front and the rear. 
Having been warned, the Spaniards took care not to go near that area. 
"Vargas3et out on November 29, 169:3, with his- entire expedition 
for Santa Fe." (Espinosa, 144) There he planned on clearing up the 
confused reports regarding the attitude of the Tanos and Tewas. Their 
silence and aloofness spoke of a potential for hostilities to break out 
if the ~}paniard'3 weren't careful. II Camped on the south :3ide of La 
Bajada Be:38., the ::':paniards were for the fir:3t time on the verge of 
-23-
-
ent,ering ,:;ountry where re'::;istance seemed certain." (Espinosa, 145) They 
had no a3surances that they would not all be trapped on the valley on 
the other side and annihilat,ed. Those who had doubts; about their 
survival became panicky. A:3 they sat around. their campfire:3 that night 
before retiring, most of the conversation dwelt upon speculation 
reg&rdin~ their fate, Fervent prayer:s Here said and the :301dier:3 
probably slept with one eye open all night, A group of soldiers and 
s;eU lers de:3erted during the night and planned on making it back to El 
Paso Hhere they felt they would be safe. 
The natives at Santa Fe Here reported as being divided in their 
attitude toward the invaders. The inhabi ta.nts blamed the snow for 
preventing them from going out to welcome the Spaniards. Now that the 
Spaniards had returned they could hunt deer and plant their crops 
without fear of the Navajos who had ra.ided their:;;ettlement ea.rlier. 
Far from home, and greatly outnumbered by unfriendJy Indians fully 
cap.:lble of e,~ecting them by fou::e of arm::>, the ~:pa.niard:s were in a. 
PC::;j.tion that was indeed precarious, Ihe danger of starvation was 
a 1 way:s prec::.e n t aIDor;;" the 
• u "By keeping the uncertain Indians 
div~ded, Vargas had been successtul both at averting starvation and in 
virtually isolating the enemy stronghold at Santa Fe." (Espinosa., 149) 
Vargas began organizin~ plans for the refounding of the missions 
and for the distribution of the rnis:3ionarie:s to twelve of the pueblos, 
More rUILors, however, were abroad that the Iewa.s and Tanos Here planning 
an attack against the Spaniard:s. The rigorous weather continued wi"(h 
-
snap storms and cold wind's. Sickne:3s; was spreading and childrerl and 
--
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infants were dying. There were several adults who had already succumbed 
to i:he elements and constant complaining could be heard. Some of the 
deserters were brought ba,:;k at this time, but Vargas used thi:::: to his 
advantage by saying that they Wl"re the vanguard of an army of 
reiniorC2ment"s coming to aid t~le settler"s. This helped bolster the 
spirits of the coloni:st::: and made c:hem as fie:3ty a:::, they were before. 
The main complaint that th • .=; colonist:s had was that they were 
suffering in the cold while the natives were sheltered behind the wall:::: 
of Santa Fe. Vargas realized that it was high time he did something to 
remedy that situation, so he ,-=alled a general council of war. "Compo:3ed 
of all the leading citizens, the missionaries, and the military 
officers, the gathering was held in his tent, and there petitions and 
complaints were registered and opinion:::; expre:3sed. tI (Es,pino:sa, 155) 
There WC1'S an unanimou'3 de.-:i'3ion by the council that the 1'ano::; be obliged 
to return to their former pueblo and the buildings of the ·:ity be 
reoccupied by the Spaniards. ;::::ome favored the use of military .force to 
expel the natives if necessary. 
The Indians observed these meetings and grew angrier because they 
knew full well what the settlers were demanding and they were prepared 
to offer resistance. Each side believed they had right on their side, 
so fighting was inevitable. The Indians prepared their weapons for 
fighting under th,,,; pretext of going on a hunt. 
the opposing sides for two days. 
The tension grew between 
Then, on the third morning after the Spani:3h r:;ouncils' decision. 
worc~ cam:: down to the camp from the villa that an attack wa:3 imminent. 
-25-
-
Vilrgas immediately sounded. the alarm by mear,s of the trumpet and the war 
drum. Soldiers and their families that were living inside the villa 
w",n~ warned to get to safety immediately. Sentrie;3 were pcested at 
5tateg1: poi,ci;s al,:mg th8 camp perimeter while Vargas rode forward to 
speak with the hostile natives. Remembering how well it had worked the 
previous year, he tried to calm the anger of the Indians. They boasted 
that the entire Indian community from mile:::, around wa;3 supporting them. 
Finally the Indians said they '",auld deliberate and give him their reply 
in the Evening. No word came that evening, however. {Espinosa, 15ED 
ThE following morning 11:=, Vargas again rode toward 
Tanos :::;r.outed that they wou 1,: lrL 1 .:':111 .)-1 
mi :33 i Cli.·~,:,- i e 3. 
£::rt1: 
::'1 .J' j ';;, r,' aided 1:;y the arrival of their Pecm; Indian 
Tb,==y stormed the villa and \'i'ithin a day it was won. The rebels 
that were captured were executed on the following Charges: "having 
stoned and destroyed a cross placed in the center of the square, broken 
a statu(~ of the Virgi Ii Mary, and commi t ted trea<::.on against God and the 
Hoyal C:~own." (E:3plnosa, 1(2) Those Indians who surrendered of their oW7'i 
free wi:1 were distri buted among the soldiers and settler:::, in servitude 
for a p'~riod of ten years, 
Th·~ Spaniards now had a solid foothold in New Mexico, but the 
--
re:::,ul ts of the conque;=;t were wide:3pread in the land. The execution'3 at 
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SD.n-CD. FE angered the war ·:;hie£5 a,nd medicinemen of the surrounding 
pue'Jlo:::,. This caused them to remain hostile and to fortify their 
pO::~L tim,s on the mesa tops. 
Th~ walled villa of Santa Fe served as a strong base from which all 
New Mexi co wa':; eventually pa,:;ified, In early 1694, however, almost the 
ent ire country:::.ide wa'3 host ile. "Of the twenty-odd pueblos, only fDur 
wer'? thE~ allies of the Spaniard::;: Pecos, the Keres of Santa Ana, 
and San Felipe," (Espinosa, 16'3) This entire year would be spent in 
strife with the surrounding pueblo tribes. "On July 20, 1694, the 
:;ampaign was a.nnounced agaiuEt the Jemez and the Kere:3 of Santo Domingo. 
The foLmling day Vargas and 120 men sallied forth from Scmta Fe." 
:E:=:;pinocoa, 199) By the middle of September, 1694·, the Jemez and Kere3 
had been defeated. 
In 1695 New Mexico wac3 at last laying the foundations of3elf" 
reliance and perm::mency, "Vargas Hrote to the viceroy, • Wi th sai Is fu II 
we forge aheac1."'(E:3pino3a, 221> Twelve mi'3sion:3 had been e'::;,tablished 
by this year ~hroughout the differen~ pueblos. liThe Spanish ,:=:,tronghold 
at Santd Fe consisted of a presidio of 100 soldiers with their families, 
approxi:mtely 130 families of settlers, and two missionaries. II <Espinosa, 
222) LLvestock multiplied in number, but the colony was continually 
plagued by a lack of :::;upplies and eqUipment. The extension of Spanish 
rule, pLu3 the ree:3tabli,:;bment of mi::;sion station;:::;, was hal ted by the 
uprising of 1696, Tt.ey ",ere renewed after this ,::;onf11.:·t was solved. 
Di.=go de V,3.~a:3 '30ught membership in the pre::=:;i: i31ou.3 m! I i tary order 
-
of Sa.ni:Lilgo. His father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had been 
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member:;: of thi's distinguL3hed order he wanted entry into. In 16'~7 he 
wrote tel 3. member of the Council of the Orders, a:3k:ingto obtain ,} 
decree providing that a knight of Santiago invest him in the nearest 
,:1urch ,end that he be allm{ed an '1bsence from New Mexico for one 1undre.::. 
days for the purpose. "Whatever the impediment family enemie:::,. lack 
of material Health, charge:: pending ag8inst him in Mexi,:o City - the 
recolonizer of New Mexico failed to gain membership in the Order of 
Santiago." (Kessell, 20) 
In )u 11', 16(9) Varga::; was conf i ned in Santa Fe by order of his 
successor in office. He was the object of the usual accusations made 
agalnst Spanish governors of the day: "cruelty to the nativEs and 
engagin2 in commerce for hi:3 own enrichment." (Beck, B9i He W,}:3 relea::=.ed 
by orders from the viceroy and returned to Mexico City. His eldest 
sur7iving son, "-Juan Manuel," met him there. (Ke::='5e11,21) Thi:=. wa::;; the 
£1r'=,t time in almost eighteen year:::. that they had :;:;;een eo3.,-:::h other. 
Wh1::.e Diego prepared hi'3 defense, hi:3 :::;on enjoyed himself around Mexico 
C1 ty. Bi::=. son. Juan, whom he had made heir to all his propertie:3 he had 
been granted with the tit Ie of marqlJes, was, ki lied at the naval battle 
of Vigo. (Kessell, 22) This incident stru,:k Varga:s to t:1E ·:ore of :~i= 
being. 
prenonition because he wrote letters to hi~ closest relatives Dn~ got 
hi::: affairs in order shortly ~fter his arrival baCK in New Mexico, POn 
tje a!terncon of Apri! 8, 1704. he died whi!e pursuing Apaches in the 
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liD Granie Valley south of present-day Albuquerque. He didn't die from 
battle, but rather from the sickness known as typhus." lKessell, 23) 
"On the eve of his departure for America, he was a 
young man of average height, straight hair, and broad 
face, with a':;pee,:;h impediment. Although he had 
ma.rried well, the chronic i ndebtednes's of the Vargas 
properties weighted heavily upon him. At the age of 
twenty-eight, in hope':; of restoring hi:::; family's 
financial welfare, he took leave of them and set out 
for New Spain." (Kessell, 23-241 
Diego added ~ittle to his already encumbered assets and in the year he 
was appeinted a,s governor of New Mexico, he wanted nothing more than to 
go home. 
BACKGROUND TO SPANISH EXPANSION 
The rapiQ advance of New Spain's northern frontier had been 
prompteG by the dir::covery of rich ,=.1 1 ver rr:i nes, foll011ed by mir::.:sionary 
a,::;t i vi tJ" and the e·=.tabl i,=,!iment of extensi ve landed e:3t,ate,=, devoted to 
agricul ~.1Jre :md the rai:3ing of 1 i ve:::.tock. Spaniards were con:3tant ly 
ha.rassed by perSistent attack::; from nomadic Indian group:::" They were a 
serious threat to the security of the mining and ranch frontiers and the 
trail on which thesil ver ,:aravan:3 traveled from northern Mexico to the 
captial To keep the raiders in check, roving patrol:s were provided to 
escort ~agon trains and scour the countryside. Indian auxiliaries were 
formed, and punitive expedition,::; were organized to go into native 
s,t ronghlJl d:3. "The mos: important innovation, however-, Wa.:3 the 
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development of Q system of forts and defensive towns placed at strategic 
coints in the heart of the silver frontier of New Spain" (Warner, 6) 
. . 
ThEse forts were called presidios, meaning a garri~30ned town or 
:ortre:3:::. The line was, constantly adjusted to meet new situation:3 as 
the froTtier advanced, From these pre::;idios and defensive settlements 
the Spariards waged campaigns of "fire and blood" again'3t the rr.arauding 
Indian tribe:3. (Warner, 7) ThL:; method only partially worked, so the new 
policy was to negotiate peaGe treaties, offering bribes of food and 
clothin[ to the Indians in the hope of inducing them to settle near the 
Spa::lish defense towm", "Once the natives had accepted a peace 
settlemEnt, they were to be Hi::;panicized by another fro:1tier 
institution, the mission." (Warner, 8) 
At the :r:is:::,ion the Indians were to be taught European c u:;:;.t am::::, and 
instructed in the Catholic religion. "It was expected that they wou Id 
eme::--[;e from thi:::, training wi thin ten years as w3eful, Christian, and 
loyal E:F'anish sljbj ects. " (',varner, 8) 
ThE last twenty years of the seventeenth century saw the security 
of the Lorthern frontiers seriously endangered by India~ uprisings. As 
iJ. r,:;s;ul t, the pre:3idial sy,=,tem on the northern frontier was reorganized. 
Also dur ing the 1680' sand 1690' s, the threat of French elL:-c).0.=t.~::'?n"': 







~~~ricans since the Spanish first began 
~,<, ccnque:::,t in "New ~:pain." The Pueblo Revolt of 16:30 is :3i8nificant 
bec'}u'3e it wa'3 the large':::.t, most unit ied, and most '3uccessful attempt by 
the pueblo Indians; to remain independent of European influence. There 
greatest success only lasted twelve years, however, because the 
per3istance of the Europeans wouldn't allow them to back down. 
The encomienda system, the presidio, and especially Don Diego de 
Vargas all played a vital role in spreading and securing Spain's hold on 
New Mex:.co. After the intense struggle they put up to keep it, Spain 
would lose its:ontrol over Mexico and eventually the northern part of 
Mexico lfould fall into the hands of the Uni ted States. 
Vlh'T was it so important for Spai n to squander so much of its 
resourr~f:'3 on a barren area like NeYf Mexico? It wasn't to ga.in the 
natives support for their conquest. It wasn't to enlarge the amount of 
territory controlled by Spain. It was because of greed and a lust for 
5il ver '''hich originally drove the Spaniard'3 into New Mexico. The Native 
Americ.,n Indians have pa.id the large'3t Gost for the greed of the 
Spaniards. They hose been reduced to a menial form of living, first 
under tie Spaniards control, and then under the control of the Eurc~~~L; 
which ca.me to be called Americans. 
Thls report tells twe :::~i 3tDr:E~ 
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Not only did he gain 
:i"".tle c,1:hc,r than a title, but hi:=, last male heir died a tragic death 
without ever getting to accept what his father had worked to give him. 
Each event that helped shape the New M.exican territory happened 
through violence or conquest of some :30rt, It's a shame that such a 
wondrous region inhabited by such a fascinating people have had to 
endJre ::iO much even after all they really wanted was to left alone. 
..-.. 
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